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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
As a result of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, the law is, at
least in the second department, that an unaggrieved citizen-taxpayer
has standing to challenge the validity of a local village law, as well
as the action of a county board of supervisors, since the Ahern
case involved such action by a county board, and was expressly
overruled by the instant case insofar as the question of standing
is concerned. As to an unaggrieved citizen-taxpayer attacking the
validity of a state law, the court of appeals case of St. Clair is
controlling, and the petitioner will be deemed to lack standing to
challenge its validity.
Mandamus unavailable to prevent Judae X from referring matter
to Judge Y.
In Kahn v. Backer,298 the question presented was whether an
Article 78 proceeding was properly brought against a justice of
the supreme court. The proceeding was instituted in the appellate
division,2 9 7 first department, in order to compel the respondent to
render a decision on a motion to dismiss a cause of action.9 8 The
case was on the general jury reserve calendar when the motion
was made. Respondent disposed of the motion by referring it to
the trial justice. The appellate division held that the respondent
had in fact exercised his discretion and that the disposition of the
motion in the above manner was the equivalent of a denial of the
motion. Proper procedure was to enter an order thereon and to
appeal the order.
The court pointed out that an Article 78 proceeding could not
be used to challenge a determination made in a civil action, unless
it was an order summarily punishing a contempt committed while
in the court's presence.299  The court also held that the disposition
of the petitioner's motion, even if erroneous, could not be indirectly
reviewed in a proceeding in the nature of mandamus, since the
only proper avenue by which one may challenge such a determina-
tion is by appeal.300
The proceeding in the Kahn case was one in the nature of
mandamus, which has always been a discretionary remedy. The
court points out, relying on well-established case law,30' that it will
945 (4th Dep't 19"57). The court made a blanket statement in this case that
injunctive relief is not appropriate in a proceeding under Article 78, Civil
Practice Act.
29621 App. Div. 2d 171, 249 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1st Dep't 1964).
297 CPLR 506(b) (1).
298 A motion to dismiss a cause of action is made pursuant to CPLR 3211.
299 CPLR 7801(2).
3oo CPLR 7801(1).
30 See, e.g., Walker v. Reidy, 31 Misc. 2d 915, 221 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Lindner v. Frisina, 194 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (Sup. Ct 1959).
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not lie where another remedy is available or provided by law.
An Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus can be used
to compel a justice to exercise the discretion he possesses by virtue
of his position, but cannot be used to compel him to exercise his
discretion in any particular manner.3
0 2
Particularity of statements in Article 78 pleadings.
Section 7804(d) is the only section in Article 78 pertaining to
pleadings, and it provides, in part, that the "petition . . . shall
comply with the rules for a complaint in an action. . . ." That
requires cross-reference to CPLR 3013. This section does not
require the pleading of "material facts," which was required under
Section 241 of the Civil Practice Act, and there is no longer the
prohibition of section 241 as to the pleading of "evidence." Under
CPLR 3013 all that is required of the pleading is that it be
sufficiently particular to furnish the parties and the court with
notice of the "transactions" or "occurrences" that the pleader intends
to prove. "Pleadings should not be dismissed or ordered amended
unless the allegations therein are not sufficiently particular to
apprise the court and parties of the subject matter of the con-
troversy." 303  To date, the leading case construing the CPLR in
this area is Foley v. D'Agostino,30" wherein the court held that
statements in a pleading are sufficiently particular if when "viewed
with reason and liberality" they "give the defendants notice of the
plaintiffs' claims . .. and of the elements of plaintiffs' alleged
cause of action. ,, 305
Gallagher GMC Sales Corp. v. Central School Dist. No. 1 306
involved an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus. One
of the questions the court was confronted with was whether the
statements in the petition were sufficiently particular. The petition
contained conclusory allegations that did in fact inform the court
and respondents of the specific transaction that the petitioner was
complaining of, yet the court felt that the statements were not suf-
ficiently particular to make out a cause of action, stating that "con-
clusory allegations not supported by facts need not be considered
" 307
The court appears to have held that it is necessary to have
specific allegations of fact in a petition, even though the so-called
302Kahn v. Backer, 21 App. Div. 2d 171, 249 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1st Dep't
1964); see CPLR 7801(1).
3033 WEimsTlN, KoRN & MILLER, NEv YoRic Csvn. PRAcTicE 113013.03
(1963).
30421 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964).
305Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 68, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 129
(1st Dep't 1964).
306 43 Misc. 2d 360, 251 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
307 Gallagher GMC Sales Corp. v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 43 Misc. 2d
360,-, 251 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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